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Robert C. Postt
"'[I]ndefiniteness' is not a quantitative concept."'
The void for vagueness doctrine is traditionally understood as con-
cerned with the capacity of legal rules to control conduct. The doctrine
underwrites the clarity of the law's distinction between acceptable and for-
bidden behavior, so as both to guide the actions of citizens and to restrict
the discretion of government officials. In the words of a recent Supreme
Court decision, the doctrine, "[a]s generally stated .... requires that a penal
statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary
people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does
not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement."2
The traditional account of void for vagueness doctrine thus focuses on
the nature of legal rules. It invites us to perceive the question of vagueness
as a continuous variable, as "a matter of degree,"3 so that one can speak of a
rule as having more or less "definiteness" and therefore as exercising more
or less control over government caprice and citizen conduct. For this rea-
son an unconstitutionally vague statute can be rewritten so as to be clearer
or more precise. Hence vagueness analysis is said to "address itself to the
form of regulation, without reference to the ultimate amenability to regula-
tion of its subject."'
I do not mean to deny that this traditional image of vagueness doctrine
is often valid and appropriate. But I wish in this Essay to call attention to a
significant class of cases in which this image is inaccurate and misleading.
In these cases courts do not use vagueness doctrine to focus on the isolated
properties of legal rules, but rather to analyze the relationship between legal
rules and forms of social order. My hypothesis is that different kinds of
legal rules presuppose and instantiate different forms of social order, and
that vagueness doctrine is frequently employed to distinguish among the
Copyright © 1994 Robert C. Post.
t Professor of Law, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California, Berkeley. A.B. 1969,
Harvard College; J.D. 1977, Yale Law School; Ph.D. 1980, Harvard University.
1. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 524 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
2. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
3. Pregent v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec., 361 F. Supp. 782, 798 (D.N.H. 1973),
vacated, 417 U.S. 903 (1974).
4. Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. Rev. 67, 113
(1960) (emphasis omitted).
HeinOnline -- 82 Cal L. Rev. 491 1994
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
forms of social order that may appropriately be enforced by law in particu-
lar circumstances. Thus an unconstitutionally vague statute sometimes can-
not simply be rewritten to be clearer or more precise; it must instead be
refashioned to reflect entirely alternative models of social life.
I
VAGUENESS AND DISCRETION
We can perhaps achieve a better fix on the concept of vagueness by
comparing it to its fraternal twin, the concept of "discretion." In conven-
tional legal parlance the doctrine of undue discretion is most often used
when laws are addressed to official decisionmakers, whereas vagueness
doctrine is typically used when legal rules directly constrain the conduct of
ordinary citizens. Because officials are presumed to act only as authorized
by law, while citizens are presumed to act freely except as restricted by law,
the doctrine of discretion is far more developed than that of vagueness.
We speak of officials as having discretion "in at least three distinct
dimensions":5 with respect to the process of their decisionmaking;6 with
respect to the review of their decisions by third parties;7 and with respect to
the specificity of the rules which constrain their decisions. These three
dimensions reflect the care we take to fuse official action with law. 8 Private
citizens, however, are not fundamentally empowered by law; they are
merely required to obey its commands. For this reason the first two dimen-
sions of discretion are largely irrelevant to vagueness doctrine, which
focuses instead chiefly on the quality of the rules by which we constrain
citizen behavior.
It is useful to compare discretion and vagueness with respect to the
third dimension of discretion. Consider the following three decision rules9
addressed to the traffic police:
1. Regulate traffic as you see fit.
2. Regulate traffic so as to avoid congestion.
5. For a full analysis, see Robert C. Post, The Management of Speech: Discretion and Rights,
1984 Sup. CT. Rav. 169, 206-21.
6. Hence we speak of the discretion of an official decisionmaker as dependent upon the particular
procedures she must use. A decisionmaker has more discretion if she need not set forth findings of fact;
she has less discretion if she must announce justifications for her decisions; she has less discretion if her
decisions must be based upon properly admitted evidence; and so forth.
7. Hence we speak of the discretion of an official decisionmaker as dependent upon the standards
by which her decisions will be reviewed. She has less discretion if her decisions will be reviewed under
a standard of independent review; she has more discretion if the standard of review is "abuse of
discretion"; and so forth.
8. To adopt a phrase Chief Justice Marshall once used to describe courts, government officials
may be said to be "the mere instruments of the law." Osborn v. President of the Bank of the United
States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 866 (1824).
9. On the distinction between decision rules, which are addressed to officials, and conduct rules,
which are addressed to the general public, see Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On
Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARv. L. REv. 625 (1984).
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3. Regulate traffic so that it alternates between two minutes'
movement in a north/south direction and three minutes' move-
ment in an east/west direction.
These rules appear arrayed on a spectrum of decreasing discretion.10
Rule 1 provides the police with no guidance; Rule 2 requires the police to
exercise judgment, while Rule 3 imposes upon the police a ministerial task
that leaves no room for discretion at all. If confining official discretion
were a legal concern, Rule 1 would be most obviously suspect, while Rule 2
would present a closer, more debatable question. Rule 3 would not be
problematic.
Now compare decision Rules 1-3 with three parallel conduct rules
addressed to the general public:
4. Cross the intersection whenever you see fit.
5. Cross the intersection only when it is safe.
6. Cross the intersection only when the light is green; do not enter
the intersection when the light is red.
Rules 4-6 are arrayed along an analogous spectrum to Rules 1-3. Rule
4 offers the citizen virtually unguided discretion; Rule 5 requires the citizen
to exercise judgment, while Rule 6 imposes on the citizen a clear, ministe-
rial duty. Rule 3 and Rule 6 are analogous in that neither raises a question
of discretion or vagueness. But there is an interesting lack of symmetry
between Rule 4 and Rule 1. If Rule 1 is problematic because of its
unbounded grant of discretion, Rule 4 poses no issue at all of unconstitu-
tional vagueness. This is because Rule 4 merely empowers citizens without
erecting restraints whose violation might subject them to legal sanction.
We could, however, reformulate Rule 4 in this way:
4a. Do not cross the intersection unless the closest policeman is
feeling benevolent toward you.
Unlike Rule 4, which authorizes citizen action, Rule 4a subjects citi-
zens to the constraints of an uncertain and unknowable legal standard. It
thus raises classic issues of vagueness, in part because of the obscure loca-
tion of legal restraint, and in part because of the large discretion ceded to
officials in determining that location. If one thinks of vagueness as a con-
tinuous variable, as a matter of more or less clarity, Rule 4a represents a
paradigmatic case."1
10. See Daniel J. Gifford, Discretionary Decisionmaking in the Regulatory Agencies: A
Conceptual Framework, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 101, 102 (1983).
1I. Why the vagueness entailed by Rule 4a should be conceived in terms of a continuous variable
is actually quite puzzling. It is probably because the official discretion established by Rule 4a is
ordinarily conceptualized in terms of a spatial metaphor, as for example in Ronald Dworkin's image of
"the hole in a doughnut,... an area left open by a surrounding belt of restriction.' RONALD DwoRKN,
TAKING Ricnrrs SEaIousLY 31 (1977). The hole represents a physical volume that can be greater or
smaller. For a different spatial metaphor, see KENarr C. DAvis. DiscRarIoNARY JusT'cE: A
PRELIMINARY INQujRY 3 (1969) ("Where law ends, discretion begins ....").
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In this Essay, I shall not address vagueness questions of the kind raised
by Rule 4a. Instead I will consider the application of vagueness doctrine to
laws like Rule 5, which impose upon citizens the obligation to exercise
judgment. This obligation necessarily mirrors that established by laws like
Rule 2, which require officials to exercise judgment as to the parameters of
permissible conduct. My exact claim is that in the context of laws like Rule
5, vagueness doctrine often functions to distinguish between acceptable and
unacceptable kinds of judgments.
II
VAGUENESS AND JUDGMENT
The law commonly expresses itself through rules whose applications
turn on the exercise of judgment. Judgments interpret and apply social
standards or norms. This is what fundamentally distinguishes Rule 5 from
Rule 4a, or Rule 2 from Rule 1. Compliance with Rule 4a or Rule 1 does
not require the citizen or official to attempt to interpret and apply shared
social standards. Instead these rules place the force of law entirely at the
service of merely private preferences,1 2 personal likes or dislikes that make
no claim to public validity. That is why courts have viewed laws like Rule
4a and Rule 1 as especially suspect from a constitutional point of view.' 3
The distinction between preferences and judgments can be illuminated
by comparing
Proposition 1: "I like strawberry ice cream."
with
Proposition 2: "Homer is a great poet."
Proposition 1 is a preference. It makes little difference whether we view it
as expressive of personal desire or instead as a factual characterization of
the subjective state of mind of the speaker. In either case Proposition 1
makes no claim upon its addressee. In contrast Proposition 2, which is a
judgment, invites its addressee to participate in a common process of evalu-
ation. This process can proceed only on the presupposition that both
speaker and addressee are committed to interpreting and applying shared
and intersubjective standards of aesthetic quality. 4 Such standards do not
12. On the distinction between judgments and preferences, see Robert C. Post, The Constitutional
Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell, 103 HARv. L. REv. 601, 624-26, 652-61 (1990).
13. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 CoLuM. L. Rnv.
1689 (1984) (arguing that many constitutional provisions are aimed at preventing the implementation of
"naked preferences").
14. These standards have a peculiar and ambiguous status. They are in some sense independent of
both speaker and addressee because they exist in a common, cultural space, and yet they are also
necessarily responsive to the ways in which they are perceived and applied by those who use them. The
status of the standards might thus be conceptualized as analogous to rules of grammar or linguistic
meaning, which are both independent of the expression of particular speakers and yet dependent upon
the expression of competent speakers generally.
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exist in a vacuum; they must be situated and maintained within real and
specific social structures. In the case of Proposition 2, such structures
would no doubt include authoritative educational and cultural institutions.
Standards situated and maintained by social structures are always the
standards of a particular social group or class or institution. It follows that
the validity of a judgment is always relative to the social group which is the
source of the standards by which the validity of the judgment is to be
assessed. As Ronald Beiner has observed, "[T]here must be underlying
grounds of judgment which human beings, qua members of a judging com-
munity, share, and which serve to unite in communication even those who
disagree (and who may disagree radically).... Judgment implies a commu-
nity that supplies common grounds or criteria by which one attempts to
decide." 15 The necessary implication is that "we require a definition of
community in order to know how the judgment shall proceed."16
There are many reasons why rules requiring judgments may be uncon-
stitutional, but there are at least two that have particular pertinence to
vagueness doctrine. First, the enforcement of a rule may require the exer-
cise of a judgment that refers for its validation to social standards that are
insufficiently dense and textured to sustain the bona fide exercise of judg-
ment. Second, the enforcement of a rule may require the exercise of ajudg-
ment that refers for its validation to social standards that constitutionally
.ought not to be applied to the social domain that is regulated by the rule.
Kolender v. Lawson17 offers a good example of the first kind of diffi-
culty. At issue in Kolender was a California statute requiring those "who
loiter or wander on the streets to provide a 'credible and reliable' identifica-
tion" when requested to do so by a police officer.18 The Court concluded
that the requirement of proffering "credible and reliable" identification was
unconstitutionally vague because "the statute vests virtually complete dis-
cretion in the hands of the police to determine whether the suspect has satis-
fied the statute and must be permitted to go on his way."19
The Court's decision was premised on its perception that there were no
shared understandings that gave meaning or content to the standard of
"credible and reliable identification." The standard referenced neither
known community norms nor established bureaucratic practices. Thus the
statute purported to require the exercise of judgment, yet the social prereq-
uisites necessary for a true exercise of judgment were in fact absent.
Application of the statute could consequently reflect only personal prefer-
ence, only pleasure or "'displeasure,"' 2 o only "'the whim of any police
15. RONALD BEINER, POLITICAL JUDGMENT 142-43 (1983).
16. Id. at 143.
17. 461 U.S. 352 (1983).
18. Id. at 353.
19. Id. at 358.
20. Id. at 360 (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 98 (1940)).
19941
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officer."' 21 Although the statute was cast in a linguistic form that appeared
to impose the obligation of judgment, the nature of the social order in which
the statute was actually embedded rendered this form deceptive. Those
applying the statute could only exercise a kind offaux judgment. Written in
language that was superficially similar to Rule 5, the statute at issue in
Kolender actually functioned like Rule 4a.
In this Essay I shall not focus on cases of faux judgment, like
Kolender, but rather on cases in which the law calls for the exercise of real
judgment. I shall explore how courts use vagueness doctrine constitution-
ally to discriminate among such judgments. My hypothesis is that this use
of vagueness doctrine ultimately entails the question of whether the norms
necessary for the validation of the relevant judgment are constitutionally
appropriate for the social domain regulated by the legal rule.
A good example of this kind of case is Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville,22 in which the Court invalidated an anti-vagrancy ordinance
of the city of Jacksonville, Florida. The ordinance consisted of a long cata-
logue of peccadillos; it was a transparent attempt by bourgeois Jacksonville
society to identify and outlaw the behavior of those who did not share their
self-disciplined, productive, middle-class virtues.23 The Court invalidated
the ordinance as "void for vagueness,"24 characterizing it as a vehicle for
"'whim' "" and "unfettered discretion. 26
This characterization of the ordinance, however, was plainly inaccu-
rate. For, as the Court recognized, the fundamental thrust of the ordinance
was to identify social "undesirables" '27 and to subject them to police control.
With respect to this crucial purpose the ordinance was anything but stan-
dardless. It is clear that competent members of upstanding Jacksonville
society could with confidence determine who was targeted by the ordinance
and who was not. The ordinance was in fact designed to maintain the
boundaries of proper Jacksonville society and thus to establish for that com-
21. Id. at 358 (quoting Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90 (1965)).
22. 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
23. The relevant law, JACKSONVILLE, FLA., ORDINANCE CODE § 26-57, provided:
Rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about begging, common gamblers,
persons who use juggling or unlawful games or plays, common drunkards, common night
walkers, thieves, pilferers or pickpockets, traders in stolen property, lewd, wanton and
lascivious persons, keepers of gambling places, common railers and brawlers, persons
wandering or strolling around from place to place without any lawful purpose or object,
habitual loafers, disorderly persons, persons neglecting all lawful business and habitually
spending their time by frequenting houses of ill fame, gaming houses, or places where
alcoholic beverages are sold or served, persons able to work but habitually living upon the
earnings of their wives or minor children shall be deemed vagrants and, upon conviction in the
Municipal Court shall be punished as provided for Class D offenses.
Id. at 156-57 n.1.
24. Id. at 162.
25. Id. at 170 (quoting Shuttlesworth, 382 U.S. at 90).
26. Id. at 168.
27. Id. at 171.
[Vol. 82:491
HeinOnline -- 82 Cal L. Rev. 496 1994
RECONCEPTUALIZING VAGUENESS
munity "its distinctive shape, its unique identity."28 The judgments
required by the ordinance were sustained by the dense network of norms
that defined middle-class rectitude and discipline.
The Court signaled its understanding of this aspect of the ordinance by
noting that what was most deeply at stake in the case was the fact that "poor
people, nonconformists, dissenters, [and] idlers ...may be required to
comport themselves according to the lifestyle deemed appropriate by the
Jacksonville police and the courts."'29 The Court knew full well that the
ordinance would not be applied to the local minister who loitered with his
parishioners after the conclusion of services, or to the local banker who
took a leisurely stroll home after a long night's work.
The ordinance at issue in Papachristou, therefore, did not function like
Rule 4a. The constitutional question posed by the ordinance was not
whether the exercise of judgment was possible, but rather whether the exer-
cise of a certain kind of judgment was permissible. The Court could have
argued that it was constitutionally forbidden to use judgments to impose
"lifestyle" norms on unwilling segments of the population, and the Court in
fact trembled at the brink of just such a substantive due process analysis:
Walkers and strollers and wanderers may be going to or com-
ing from a burglary. Loafers or loiterers may be "casing" a place for
a holdup. Letting one's wife support him is an intra-family matter,
and normally of no concern to the police. Yet it may, of course, be
the setting for numerous crimes.
The difficulty is that these activities are historically part of the
amenities of life as we have known them. They are not mentioned
in the Constitution or in the Bill of Rights. These unwritten ameni-
ties have been in part responsible for giving our people the feeling
of independence and self-confidence, the feeling of creativity.
These amenities have dignified the right of dissent and have
honored the right to be nonconformists and the right to defy submis-
siveness. They have encouraged lives of high spirits rather than
hushed, suffocating silence.
They are embedded in Walt Whitman's writings, especially in
his "Song of the Open Road." They are reflected, too, in the spirit
of Vachel Lindsay's "I Want to Go Wandering," and by Henry D.
Thoreau.30
The difficulty with this reasoning, however, is that the law commonly
inflicts social norms on unwilling populations. Most regulations of vice are
of this nature. Despite the brave acknowledgment of Whitman and
Thoreau, therefore, it would not have been easy for the Court to determine
when legal enforcement of social norms would be so productive of "hushed,
28. KAi T. ERIKSO, WAYWARD PURITANS: A STUDY IN THa SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCF 11 (1966).
29. Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 170.
30. Id. at 164.
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suffocating silence" as to be unconstitutional. Perhaps for this reason the
Court never developed this line of argument.
It is thus tempting to read the Court's resort to vagueness doctrine as
simply a cover for its embarrassing inability to develop a sustained substan-
tive analysis. But that would be too harsh. It is possible to offer a more
positive account of vagueness doctrine's contribution to Papachristou if
one focuses on the opinion's concern to prevent "arbitrary ... arrests and
convictions."'" Arbitrary arrests may follow a perfectly consistent and pre-
dictable internal logic; they may be neither random nor based upon personal
preferences. Yet such arrests may nevertheless be constitutionally arbitrary
if they answer to a logic that is legally irrelevant or unacceptable.
We can interpret Papachristou, therefore, as holding that the norms of
middle-class virtue are not a constitutionally acceptable basis for ordering
the relationship between police and citizen. The case, in effect, decides
that it is constitutionally arbitrary and improper to use compliance with
bourgeois morals as a trigger for police control. Hence the opinion's ring-
ing conclusion:
[T]he rule of law implies equality and justice in its application.
Vagrancy laws of the Jacksonville type teach that the scales of jus-
tice are so tipped that even-handed administration of the law is not
possible. The rule of law, evenly applied to minorities as well as
majorities, to the poor as well as the rich, is the great mucilage that
holds society together.32
On this reading, vagueness doctrine functions in Papachristou to over-
see the kinds of judgments that can be made by government officials within
the domain of police-citizen interactions. The case strongly suggests that
such judgments are valid only if justified by reference to the kinds of
impersonal norms described by Max Weber as rational and bureaucratic.33
Judgments that by contrast appeal for validation to middle-class mores are
deemed unconstitutionally arbitrary, vague, and unenforceable. Although
vagueness doctrine enters this reasoning as a bare summary conclusion, as a
bald determination that certain judgments are inappropriate, it is neverthe-
less fair to read the doctrine in Papachristou as clearly distinguishing
between circumstances where the rule of law can constitutionally reflect
and incorporate community norms3 4 and circumstances where the rule of
law is expected to repel and override such norms.
31. Id. at 162.
32. Id. at 171.
33. See MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SociETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 223-26
(Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds. & Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., 1978).
34. For examples of the law functioning in this way, see Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations
of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957 (1989); Paul
Bohannan, The Differing Realms of the Law, AM. ANTHROPOLOoIST, Dec. 1965 (part 2), at 33 (special
issue on Ethnography and Law, Laura Nader ed.).
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III
VAGUENESS AND THE MARKET
The tension between the rule of law and community mores is sharpest
where legal standards serve policies that run contrary to ordinary under-
standings. The best example in contemporary constitutional law is the area
of freedom of speech, where the First Amendment can be understood as
self-consciously functioning to suspend community norms.35 It is for this
reason that vagueness doctrine has in recent years been most fully devel-
oped in the arena of freedom of expression.
In the first third of the 20th century, however, the tension between the
rule of law and social mores was most pronounced in the arena of property
law, and most especially in the regulation of market transactions. The pre-
New Deal Court strove mightily to insulate market transactions from what it
viewed as unconstitutional regulation, and in the process it developed a
well-articulated vagueness doctrine. In this Part, I shall carefully examine
one important case in that development, Cline v. Frink Dairy Co.,36 in order
to demonstrate how vagueness doctrine served a function that is closely
analogous to that which we have identified in the politically quite dissimilar
decision of Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville.
Cline involved a bill in equity to enjoin the enforcement of a Colorado
antitrust statute that prohibited combinations in restraint of trade except
where the purpose of combining was "to obtain only a reasonable profit in
such products or merchandise as can not yield a reasonable profit except by
marketing them under the combinations previously condemned."3 7 The
"line between lawfulness and criminality" thus was dependent upon:
first[,] what commodities need to be handled according to the trust
methods condemned in the first part of the Act to enable those
engaged in dealing in them to secure a reasonable profit therefrom;
second.... what generally would be a reasonable profit for such a
business; and third, what would be a reasonable profit for the
defendant under the circumstances of his particular business. It
would, therefore, be a complete defense for the defendant to prove
in this case that it is impossible to sell milk or milk products, except
by trust methods and make a reasonable profit, if he also showed
that by such methods he had in fact only made a reasonable profit.38
The Court unanimously struck down the Colorado statute as vague, saying
that it would be unconstitutional "[tlo compel defendants to guess on the
peril of an indictment whether one or more of the restrictions of the statute
will destroy all profit or reduce it below what would be reasonable."39
35. For a full discussion, see Post, supra note 12.
36. 274 U.S. 445 (1927).
37. Id. at 456.
38. Id. at 456-57.
39. Id. at 457-58.
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In reaching this conclusion the Court was required to distinguish seem-
ingly similar contexts in which the legal standard of "reasonableness" was
concededly legitimate.40 Defenders of the Colorado statute argued that neg-
ligence law commonly imposes upon members of the general public a duty
to act in a "reasonable" way. The Court, however, would not accept the
analogy:
It is true that, on an issue like negligence, i.e., a rule of conduct for
the average man in the avoidance of injury to his neighbors, every
one may be held to observe it either on the civil or criminal side of
the court. It is a standard of human conduct which all are reason-
ably charged with knowing and which must be enforced against
every one in order that society can safely exist .... "The criterion in
such cases is to examine whether common social duty would, under
the circumstances, have suggested a more circumspect conduct."...
But it will not do to hold an average man to the peril of an
indictment for the unwise exercise of his economic or business
knowledge involving so many factors of varying effect that neither
the person to decide in advance nor the jury to try him after the fact
can safely and certainly judge the result.41
One important theme of this passage is that judgments of reasonableness in
the area of negligence are acceptable because they depend upon standards
of human conduct "which all are reasonably charged with knowing" in that
they involve "common social duty," whereas judgments of reasonableness
in the area of market price transactions are vague because they have no such
ascertainable referents.
We must ask, however, whether this asserted absence of referents rests
on descriptive grounds, as in Kolender, or on normative grounds, as in
Papachristou. The latter conclusion is strongly suggested by Cline's con-
cession that public utility rates must constitutionally be set so as to provide
for a "reasonable" rate of return. The Court acknowledged the many cases
in which it had condemned public utility commissions for "taking" property
by imposing unreasonably low rates. 42 But the Court nevertheless insisted
that the standard of "reasonable profits" was inappropriate in the specific
context of the Colorado statute:
On questions of confiscatory rates for public utilities, for instance,
courts must examine in great detail the circumstances and reach a
40. So, for example, the Court noted that the Sherman Act's criminalization of unreasonable
restraints on trade did not turn on "the reasonableness of the prices fixed or the profit realized," but
instead upon well-elaborated common law rules classifying the legality of forms of business
arrangements. Id. at 460-63.
41. Id. at 464-65 (citation omitted).
42. See, e.g., Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679
(1923); Missouri ex reL Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276 (1923).
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conclusion as to a reasonable profit. But this does not justify in
such a case holding the average member of society in advance to a
rule of conduct measured by his judgment and action in respect to
what is a reasonable price or a reasonable profit.43
Using our typology of legal rules, we might summarize the Court's
contention in the following way. Although a decision rule which provides:
Rule 2a: Regulate rates so as to allow for a reasonable profit.
would not cede unconstitutional discretion to government officials, a con-
duct rule which provides:
Rule 5a: Do not conspire to set prices that generate an unreasona-
ble profit.
is unconstitutionally vague. So phrased, it is clear that the Court's conten-
tion cannot be that Rule 5a has no meaningful referents; the Court's argu-
ment must rather be that the standards which give content to Rule 2a are
inappropriate for use with respect to the "average members of society" gov-
erned by Rule 5a.
Why might this be so? It is clear that the Court understood vagueness
doctrine to apply in a different way to decision rules than to conduct rules.
Thus it stated in Mahler v. Eby' that "[t]he rule as to a definite standard of
action is not so strict in cases of the delegation of legislative power to exec-
utive boards and officers."'45 The Court took pains to emphasize that it was,
in contrast, extremely important to assure that criminal statutes "inform the
accused sufficiently of the nature and cause of the accusation."4 6
We commonly explain this difference between decision rules and con-
duct rules in terms of the concept of fairness. It is said, as Cline itself
avers, that it would be wrong "[t]o compel defendants to guess on the peril
of an indictment" as to the meaning of a statutory standard.47 But if the use
of the verb "guess" is meant to imply that it would be difficult or impossi-
ble for citizens to ascertain the substance of the statutory standard, the exist-
ence of Rule 2a demonstrates that this claim is false. The large body of
doctrine and precedents guiding the implementation of Rule 2a suggests
that fairly definite legal criteria would have been readily available to citi-
zens who wished to comply with Rule 5a. If Cline rests on the value of
fairness, therefore, it is not on the simple notion that fairness prohibits pun-
ishing persons for transgressing unknowable standards.
In fact Cline appears to rest on a very different idea. The Court's
decision must flow from its normative refusal to require members of the
general public to internalize the bureaucratic imperatives of Rule 2a as
43. Cline, 274 U.S. at 464.
44. 264 U.S. 32 (1924).
45. Id. at 41.
46. Id.
47. Cline, 274 U.S. at 457.
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guides to ordinary market price transactions. Thus, as in Papachristou,
vagueness doctrine functions to police the kinds of standards that may
legally be intruded on particular social domains. This function is also
apparent in the Court's repudiation of the negligence analogy, by which the
Court exempted market price transactions from the requirements of "com-
mon social duty." Evidently, the Court had determined that the decisions of
"average members of society" to set prices should remain unconstrained by
both the bureaucratic standards of Rule 2A and the community norms
embodied in negligence law. The liberation of market price transactions
from these requirements is entirely consistent with the pre-New Deal
Court's hostility to price-fixing legislation as inimical to "the individual
freedom of action contemplated by the Constitution."48
By understanding the function of vagueness doctrine in Cline in this
way, we can make visible the subterranean paths through which the ideo-
logical perspective that dominated the Court during the 1920s exercised its
influence. The pre-New Deal Court viewed market price transactions as
expressive of the essential autonomous individuality of the mature citizen;
it consequently'regarded price regulations as paternalistic and as inconsis-
tent with the constitutionally necessary independence of the person. It
should not be surprising, therefore, that the Court would be reluctant to
require individuals to internalize and apply either norms of "common social
duty" or imperatives of bureaucratic social policy at precisely the moment
when its constitutional theory dictated that individuals should be most
freely expressing their essential autonomous personality.49
Vagueness doctrine was one vehicle through which the Court
expressed this substantive political philosophy."0 The Court used vague-
ness doctrine to maintain spheres of citizen conduct free from the regulation
of rules that would have required for their enforcement judgments imposing
48. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 561 (1923) (striking down the District of
Columbia's Minimum Wage Act as an unconstitutional interference with the liberty of contract),
overruled by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
49. Thus, 36 years later in United States v. National Dairy Products Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963),
when the Court upheld against a vagueness attack the section of the Robinson-Patman Act "making it a
crime to sell goods at 'unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating
a competitor,"' id. at 29 (quoting § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act), the Court's reasoning was
explicitly premised on its conclusion that the statute regulated "activity which is neither constitutionally
protected nor socially desirable." Id. at 36. The Court's new-found ability to locate in the standard of
"unreasonably low prices" "a meaningful referent in business practice or usage," id., was no doubt made
possible by its altered substantive vision of the normative importance of market price transactions for
defining the person.
50. See, e.g., Adkins, 261 U.S. at 555. Justice Holmes, who did not share this political philosophy,
might have concurred in Cline for a different reason. Holmes had earlier written, in one of the Court's
very first uses of the vagueness doctrine, that "[v]alue is the effect in exchange of the relative social
desire for compared objects expressed in terms of a common denominator." International Harvester Co.
v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 222 (1914). For Holmes, therefore, profit and price were determined solely
by personal preferences, and he might thus have viewed the concept of a "reasonable price" as a
contradiction in terms. For Holmes, Rule 5a might have been the functional equivalent of Rule 4a.
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community or bureaucratic norms. Since the 1960s the Supreme Court has
used vagueness doctrine to accomplish the identical goal in the sphere of
freedom of expression.5
IV
VAGUENESS AND SocIAL ROLES
Vagueness doctrine in Cline served matters of high constitutional pol-
icy. By policing the circumstances under which the law could require citi-
zens to internalize and enact particular kinds of norms and standards,
vagueness doctrine functioned as a medium through which the Court
implicitly defined the nature of the autonomy it believed necessary for
citizenship.
In this last Part of my Essay, I wish briefly to review two cases where
vagueness doctrine serves analogous functions, only in the more humble
and limited domain of organizational structure. Government officials com-
monly exercise control over members of state institutions, and vagueness
doctrine is not infrequently used to probe the nature and reach of that con-
trol. My thesis is that because the doctrine requires courts to test the kinds
of judgments that can be exercised within organizational contexts, the doc-
trine necessarily becomes a medium for judicial inquiry into the range of
constitutionally acceptable forms of institutional structure.
Parker v. Levy52 raises these issues in a particularly clear way. It con-
cerned the court-martial of Howard Levy, an Army captain who had agreed
to serve in the military for two years if permitted first to complete his medi-
cal training. Levy spoke out against the Vietnam War and was subse-
quently convicted of violating Article 133 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, which prohibits "conduct unbecoming an officer and a gen-
tleman."53 Levy challenged Article 133 as unconstitutionally vague. The
Court rejected his claim in a five to three decision.
The disagreement between the majority and dissent is highly illuminat-
ing. The Court noted that Article 133 received its specific content from
"the longstanding customs and usages of the services"54 and that its mean-
ing was "'not measurable by our innate sense of right and wrong, of honor
and dishonor, but must be gauged by an actual knowledge and experience
of military life, its usages and duties."' 55 The dissent, however, plausibly
argued that it was merely "judicial fantasy" to assume that Levy, "a draft-
induced volunteer whose military indoctrination was minimal, at best," was
51. See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974) (striking down a Massachusetts "flag-
misuse" statute as unconstitutionally vague).
52. 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
53. 10 U.S.C. § 933 (1988).
54. Parker, 417 U.S. at 746-47.
55. Id. at 748-49 (quoting Swaim v. United States, 28 Ct. C1. 173, 228 (1893), aftd, 165 U.S. 553
(1897)).
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"so imbued with the ancient traditions of the military as to comprehend the
arcane meaning of' Article 133.56 The dissenters objected that "we do a
grave disservice to citizen soldiers in subjecting them to the uncertain
regime of Art[ ]. 133 ... simply because [this] provision[ ] did not offend
the sensibilities of the federal judiciary in a wholly different period of our
history."57
The majority and dissent thus agreed that the judgments required by
Article 133 made sense only in the context of ancient military customs and
traditions. They disagreed, however, on the question of whether it was con-
stitutional for modem military law to serve as the vehicle for the application
of these customs and traditions. At times both sides of the debate appeared
to turn this disagreement on the narrow empirical question of whether Levy
himself might actually have been aware of these traditional military norms.
But in fact both majority and dissent were more powerfully drawn to the
institutional dimensions of the question.
It is fair to characterize the Court's opinion as driven by its conclusion
that the continued application of military custom was necessary for the
achievement of military objectives. The Court's basic point was that,
because the military needs "to maintain the discipline essential to perform
its mission effectively," 58 it can constitutionally establish legal standards
like Article 133 "'conditioned to meet certain overriding demands of disci-
pline and duty."' 59 Precisely because the ancient traditions applied through
Article 133 were indispensable to sustain the mission of the army, these
traditions could validly be used to define the role of a military officer.
The dissent objected to this functional account: "I should suppose that
vague laws, with their serious capacity for arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement, can in the end only hamper the military's objectives of high
morale and esprit de corps." 60 The dissent's objection imagined that
soldiers would respond to the ancient customs referenced by Article 133
with the incredulity of civilians. The dissent's objection no doubt sprang
from its focus on the large influx of Vietnam era "citizen-soldiers." But
because citizen-soldiers have been characteristic of the American military
since its inception, the issue for the dissent must have been less the physical
presence of these citizen-soldiers, than the perceived need for the military to
alter its institutional structure to more closely approximate the civilian
norms characteristic of these soldiers. The essential disagreement on the
56. Id. at 782 (Stewart, J.; dissenting).
57. Id. at 783 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 744.
59. Id. (quoting Bums v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953)). The Court further noted that "[t]he
fundamental necessity for obedience, and the consequent necessity for imposition of discipline, may
render permissible within the military that which would be constitutionally impermissible outside it."
Id. at 758.
60. Id. at 788 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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Court, therefore, was whether it made institutional sense for soldiers to be
treated more like civilians.
In this way vagueness doctrine became in Levy a medium through
which the Court implicitly debated organizational structure. The general
point I wish to make is that vagueness doctrine will often serve this func-
tion. This is because the doctrine requires courts to evaluate the standards
which can be brought to bear in the enforcement and enactment of institu-
tional roles, and this task necessarily requires courts to evaluate the identity
of those roles.
This can plainly be seen in my last example, which is meant to drive
the point home to an academic audience. San Filippo v. Bongiovanni6'
concerned the dismissal of a tenured professor of chemistry, Joseph San
Filippo, from Rutgers University. The relevant Rutgers regulation provided
that tenured professors were subject to dismissal for "'failure to maintain
standards of sound scholarship and competent teaching." 62 San Filippo
was dismissed, however, for abusing visiting foreign scholars by requiring
them to perform domestic work like gardening and cleaning and for submit-
ting false expense reports for these scholars.
San Filippo argued that the charges against him, even if true, had noth-
ing to do with sound scholarship or competent teaching, and hence that the
regulation was void for vagueness as applied to him. The district court
accepted this argument, noting "that it was 'unforeseeable' that Rutgers
would use ethical violations, albeit segued into the 'sound scholarship and
competent teaching language,' to dismiss San Filippo and, thus, that he was
deprived of his right of fair warning."6 3 The Third Circuit, however,
reversed:
A reasonable, ordinary person using his common sense and general
knowledge of employer-employee relationships would have fair
notice that the conduct the University charged Dr. San Filippo with
put him at risk of dismissal under a regulation stating he could be
dismissed for "failure to maintain standards of sound scholarship
and competent teaching." He would know that the standard did not
encompass only actual teaching or research skills. Here, all of Dr.
San Filippo's charged actions sprang from his role as a faculty
member at the University. It is not unfair or unforeseeable for a
tenured professor to be expected to behave decently toward students
and coworkers, to comply with a superior's directive, and to be
truthful and forthcoming in dealing with payroll, federal research
funds or applications for academic positions. Such behavior is
required for the purpose of maintaining sound scholarship and com-
61. 961 F.2d 1125 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 305 (1992).
62. Id. at 1127 (quoting Rutgers University Regulation 3.94).
63. San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 743 F. Supp. 327, 337 (D.NJ. 1990), rev'd, 961 F.2d 1125 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 305 (1992).
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petent teaching. The academic community can reasonably conclude
that otherwise the educational atmosphere is likely to become so
tainted and disturbed that it would become impossible to "maintain
standards of sound scholarship and competent teaching."...
• . . Were we to accept Dr. San Filippo's argument that [the
regulations] were void for vagueness... the University could never
discharge Dr. San Filippo, or any other tenured professor, for any
conduct not directly involving teaching or research .... 64
On the surface the debate between the district and circuit courts is
about whether it is fair to charge San Filippo with knowledge that he could
be dismissed for abusing visiting foreign scholars. But on closer inspection
the issue of fairness can itself be seen to turn on the legal conception of the
role of a tenured university professor. The district court understands
professors as employees, chargeable only with knowledge of the explicit
content of the rules by which they are governed. The circuit court, in con-
trast, conceives professors as professionals, chargeable with knowledge of
all the complex, traditional, and unwritten mores of the "academic commu-
nity." Because it is "fair" to attribute to San Filippo the knowledge appro-
priate to his role, the disagreement between the courts, although phrased in
terms of vagueness doctrine, actually depends upon an underlying norma-
tive debate about the legal and social meaning of being a university
professor.
Vagueness doctrine, of course, has nothing intrinsically to say about
the role of a tenured professor, just as it has nothing intrinsically to say
about the role of military officers. But because the doctrine requires courts
to decide what kinds of judgments may appropriately be attributed to insti-
tutional actors, it necessarily becomes the occasion for judicial determina-
tion of the forms of social order that may be used to define the roles of
those actors. In San Filippo the real difference between district and appel-
late courts concerned the location of the line separating the social world of
professionalism from that of the employee,6" just as in Levy the real argu-
ment between majority and dissent concerned the location of the line sepa-
rating military from civilian culture.
CONCLUSION
The traditional account of vagueness doctrine, with its image of legal
rules arrayed along a continuous spectrum of precision or clarity, renders
these debates invisible. This is fundamentally because the traditional
account narrowly focuses on the isolated properties of legal rules rather
than on the relationship between these rules and the forms of social life that
64. San Filippo, 961 F.2d at 1137-38 (citation omitted).
65. For a relevant and illuminating discussion of the sociological differences between these two
social roles, see W. Richard Scott's paper in PROFESSIONALZATION 265 (Howard M. Vollmer & Donald
L. Mills eds., 1966).
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sustain and vivify them. Once this relationship is thematized, however, it is
immediately apparent that cases like Papachristou, Cline, and Levy do not
turn on the abstract clarity of legal rules, but rather on the kinds of judg-
ments, and hence the concomitant kinds of social order, which the state may
constitutionally authorize and impose.
In these cases, therefore, vagueness doctrine serves as a vehicle for the
implicit judicial resolution of independent questions of substantive constitu-
tional law. We can, on the one hand, view this as a weakness of vagueness
doctrine, because the doctrine suppresses a full and frank judicial evaluation
of these substantive constitutional issues. Thus we might criticize
Papachristou for using vagueness doctrine to evade a complete and explicit
analysis of the kinds of judgments that can constitutionally be exercised by
the police in dealing with the public.
But, on the other hand, we might also reflect that courts are often
neither equipped nor prepared to offer comprehensive and candid constitu-
tional analyses of social relationships, and that in such circumstances
vagueness doctrine offers a useful means of exercising discriminating, indi-
rect, and yet effective judicial control. Thus even if the Court in
Papachristou were intellectually or politically unwilling to offer a full-
blown constitutional assessment of transactions between the police and the
public, it could nevertheless deploy vagueness doctrine strongly to influ-
ence legislative regulation of these transactions.
In the context of cases like Papachristou, Cline, and Levy, therefore,
we may conclude that the value of vagueness doctrine lies essentially in the
value of judicial and constitutional indirection.
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